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A B S T R A C T
In sub-Saharan Africa, commercial bioenergy production has been hailed as
a new form of ‘green capitalism’ that will deliver ‘win-win’ outcomes and ‘pro
poor’ development. Yet in an era of global economic recession and soaring food
prices, biofuel ‘sustainability’ has been at the centre of controversy. This paper
focuses on the case of post-war Sierra Leone, a country that has over the last
decade been consistently ranked as one of the poorest in the world, facing food
insecurity, high unemployment and entrenched poverty. Following a recent
government strategy to secure foreign direct investment in biofuels production
in agriculturally rich regions of the country, the largest foreign investment in
Sierra Leone since the end of its civil war has been secured: a Swiss company
is to invest US$ million into a large-scale biofuels project over the course of
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 years, and promises to simultaneously stimulate an enabling environment for
investment, provide job opportunities for youth and increase food production.
For multiple actors involved in the project, the concept of ‘sustainability’ is
crucial but accordingly there are varying interpretations of its meaning. Such
differences in interpretation and the complex contradictions within discourses
of sustainability are in turn framed by the various scales within which these
actors are situated. While attempts have been made to manage these
contradictions through global sustainability standards, the unequal power
relations between different actors will ultimately determine the ways in which
they are likely to be resolved. The paper concludes by reﬂecting on how these
processes may be contributing to a changing governance landscape and wider
global political economy within which bioenergy is being produced, processed
and consumed.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
In recent years, biofuel production in sub-Saharan Africa has reached
unprecedented levels. But in an era of global economic recession and
rising food prices, the sustainability of policies that have supported the
growth of the biofuel sector is increasingly being questioned. Although
long hailed as a panacea for mitigating climate change and reducing
fossil fuel dependence, biofuels’ ‘green credentials’ have come under
attack: the land grabbing associated with their production is now being
linked to increased food prices and hunger, incidences of land conﬂict
and rising CO emissions. In response to growing socio-economic
concerns over an emerging global ‘agroenergy complex’, multinational
companies engaged in biofuel production in sub-Saharan Africa have
adopted comprehensive corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies.
Nowhere has this been more evident than in post-war Sierra Leone,
an impoverished country which, despite facing acute food insecurity,
is pursuing a liberalised path to development, including the promotion
of foreign direct investment in biofuel production.
Sierra Leone’s emerging biofuel industry has been praised as
a potential ‘pathway to development’ for the rural poor. However, a
‘food vs. fuel debate’ now overshadows production, highlighted by
concerns over how ‘sustainability’ is interpreted by various stakeholders
at different scales. This paper critically explores these issues in further
detail in the context of a recent major bioenergy investment by the
Swiss company, Bovid Agroenergy. The company aims to develop a
greenﬁeld integrated agricultural and renewable energy project in the
heart of Sierra Leone’s ‘bread basket’ region in Bombali and Tonkolili
Districts, to grow sugar cane for the production of fuel ethanol
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and electricity. While all stakeholders in the investment – the company,
government and the affected communities themselves – agree that
‘sustainability’ is a crucial condition for operations, the investment
raises important questions around how sustainability is being inter-
preted by different groupings of actors, how such interpretations
differ and are shaped by diverging underlying agendas, and what this
ultimately means for implementation. This paper explores how such
contentions shape the decisions that may be taken by such operators,
and in turn how they are framed by the governance landscape and
the wider global political economy within which bioenergy is being
produced, processed and consumed.
A primary concern of the paper is to shed light on how Bovid
Agroenergy has interpreted sustainability standards and incorporated
them in its operations. The analysis is informed by interviews with a wide
range of actors, including the Deputy Managing Director of Bovid
based in Switzerland, the company’s HSSE Manager based in Sierra
Leone, a variety of stakeholders involved in formulating and implement-
ing the Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels (RSB) Standards (RSB
), a range of local and national politicians in Sierra Leone, as well
as people living in project-affected communities. Our ‘actor-oriented’
approach therefore incorporates an interest in understanding how
different perspectives, obligations and power relationships across
different scales have shaped decision-making around the project, and,
in particular, how these have been framed by wider discourses around
sustainability.
Following this introduction, the ﬁrst section of the paper context-
ualises the wider global political economy that is shaping the on-going
and rapid expansion of bioenergy investments in developing countries,
and locates Sierra Leone within this process. In exploring the political
and economic drivers that have fuelled global biofuel expansion, it
becomes evident that the pursuit of ‘sustainable’ biofuels is a complex
and contradictory process, framed by powerful discourses and practices.
This discussion sets the stage for the second section, which brieﬂy
reviews global efforts to manage sustainability, arguing that these same
discourses are instrumental in constructing different interpretations
of what sustainability actually entails in practice. The paper then moves
on to a more detailed analysis of Sierra Leone in the third section,
providing the context for Bovid’s bioenergy investment, and outlining
how ‘sustainability’ has, on the surface, been aligned with the agendas
of the government and of project-affected communities. However, it is
also apparent that a disconnect between interpretations of biofuel
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sustainability has resulted in increasing tension between different actors.
In the fourth section of the paper, these tensions are further explored
through an analysis of the project and its impacts from the perspective
of the company. While it is clear that Bovid must acknowledge the
positions of a multiplicity of project stakeholders, it is also evident that
the company’s main approach to sustainability through the certiﬁcation
process has become an important mechanism for protecting both
the project and its investors from social and ﬁnancial risk. In the
ﬁnal section, we conclude by reﬂecting on the different positions of
stakeholders, as they are framed by the various scales within which
different actors are situated. A better appreciation of this disconnect
is important for developing a more nuanced understanding of how
different actors and their widely varying agendas deﬁne sustainability,
and how contradictions in interpretations might ultimately be resolved.
T H E G L O B A L P O L I T I C A L E C O N O M Y O F B I O F U E L S E X P A N S I O N
Over the last two decades, there has been a dramatic growth in the
production of bioenergy across the globe, with some estimates
suggesting that commercial biofuel production has increased ﬁve-fold
(Earth Policy Institute ). Such an expansion of high intensity
industrial agriculture into energy feedstocks is the latest development in
the on-going expansion of globalised agricultural production. More
broadly, recent research considering the impact of globalisation on food
production and the attendant proliferation of industrialised agriculture
worldwide has singled out a number of key drivers that have been
fuelling such change. These include: favourable terms of trade and
macro-economic policies, growing competition between industrialised
agricultural exporting countries and ‘new agricultural countries’, and
the incorporation of agricultural production into global commodity
chains that have become increasingly vertically coordinated, with greater
concentrations of power in their ‘leading agents’ including retailers and
in particular supermarkets (Friedmann ; Friedmann ; Raikes
& Gibbon ; Dolan & Humphrey ; Ponte ; Dauvergne
& Neville ).
In relation to the recent expansion of biofuel investment in both
the global North and South, the drivers have largely been the same, but
with the important addition of binding targets and mandates relating to
the use of bioenergy (Scarlat & Dallemand ). Both the USA and
EU, as well as Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand have recently adopted mandates
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to blend biofuels (Scarlat & Dallemand ). In the USA, for example,
the Energy Independence and Security Act  mandates an increase
in biofuel production to  billion gallons per year by ; and in
Europe, the  Renewable Energy Directive (RED) sets out that by
, % of energy used and % of each member state’s transport
fuel must come from ‘renewable sources’. However, as pointed out
by Hollander (), such mandates to consume support long-term
capital investment by providing a degree of stable demand, regardless of
whether or not bioenergy is cheaper than fossil fuels. These artiﬁcially
inﬂated levels of demand for transport fuels far outstrip current
domestic harvests of biofuels. Moreover, while biofuels do not, nor
will not, drive the prices of transportation fuels, given their low relative
contribution to them (Kojima & Klytchnikova ), linking energy
and agriculture ‘ampliﬁes volatility in both markets’ (Hollander :
–).
In addition to mandates driving the expansion of biofuel production
across the developing world, such drivers have themselves been under-
lain by four forceful motivations, each of which has been critically
explored by scholars in a wide range of contexts. These are: () the need
to mitigate climate change; () the rising prices of fossil fuels;
() concerns for energy security; and () the need for rural develop-
ment in the global South (FAO/GBEP ). The combination of these
drivers have created powerful discourses supporting the growth of the
biofuel industry, which have persisted in spite of the validity of each
having been widely critiqued and challenged.
In the context of this paper, a detailed review of the ﬁrst three
motivating factors is beyond the scope of the discussion. Instead, in the
case of Sierra Leone, the primary motivating factor that has most
frequently been employed to justify plans for the expansion of biofuel
production has been the critical need for rural development. This
position has been forcefully supported by biofuels proponents,
who, in the aftermath of the country’s decade-long civil war of the
s, believe that large-scale agriculture projects will provide a primary
injection to kick-start both food production and the rural economy.
While in recent years a critical counter-position that challenges the
intensiﬁed commodiﬁcation of farm land and labour has emerged,
proponents of large-scale capital investments in agriculture believe
that this will stimulate an ‘agrarian transition’ away from subsistence
production and towards wage work on large farms, which will invariably
lead to economic growth, and, by extension, poverty reduction for rural
populations.
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In the context of other recent bioenergy investments across the
African continent, proponents have often claimed that such investments
will stimulate rural development by way of direct and indirect ‘trickle
down’ effects to local communities (de Nie et al. ). For example, as
summarised by Richardson (: ), who speciﬁcally considers the
sugar industry in Zambia, ‘agro-exports can make an indirect contri-
bution to rural development by promoting national economic growth
and resilience’, and investment in export crops for bioenergy can directly
support rural development by ‘increas[ing] on-farm and off-farm
employment and revenue’. This has led to a number of key international
ﬁnancial institutions, including the World Bank, encouraging develop-
ing countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, to support directly
or indirectly the expansion of the production of bioenergy both for
domestic consumption and for export (World Bank ). In
turn, trade agreements relating to feedstocks for bioenergy have been
adopted not only between developed and developing countries, but also
between developing and developing countries (Dauvergne & Neville
). However, the expansion of bioenergy ‘for development’, or
rather the form of high-intensity industrial agricultural production and
processing of crops that is supported by the speciﬁc combination
of factors combining to produce this wider global political biofuels
economy, has frequently come under intense criticism (Magdoff ;
McMichael a).
The nub of the biofuels controversy for many critics – and an issue
that has direct relevance to the current state of food insecurity in Sierra
Leone – has been the diversion of food crops from developing countries
to ‘feedstocks’ to fuel over-consumption in the developed world. The
scale and speed of this conversion has been unprecedented and is
often cited as a contributing factor to rocketing food prices across
the global South (Bailey ; McMichael a). In  and again
in , countering their potential contribution to rural development,
were signiﬁcant spikes in the prices of food commodities that had
a considerable impact on poverty in the global South. Such spikes
have been linked to the dramatic rise in the production of bioenergy
feedstocks on land that formerly would have produced food
(McMichael, ). When the rapid expansion of global agri-business
into biofuels is underpinned by developed countries’ on-going over-
consumption of energy, such a critique of biofuels is thrown into stark
perspective.
Resulting from this proliferation of biofuels production has been
a dramatic increase in foreign investments in land in developing
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countries, land that might have been available for growing domestic
food crops to ameliorate the situation (Cotula et al. , ;
GRAIN ). This is particularly the case in sub-Saharan Africa, which
as McMichael (b: ) notes, has now been dubbed the ‘Green
OPEC’ because its extensive land reserves have attracted agrofuel capital
from a vast range of investors from Brazil, Saudi Arabia, China, the
World Bank, USAID, the European Commission, and various private
companies. While a recent World Bank () report entitled Rising
Global Interest in Farmland: can it yield sustainable and equitable beneﬁts?
suggests that large-scale acquisitions in land can stimulate the employ-
ment of wage workers and contribute to poverty alleviation, such
arguments have spawned a series of critiques within the global ‘land-
grab’ debate (e.g. see Li ). Many land purchases have been
controversial, even in cases where such land has not formerly been used
to produce food but has been deﬁned as ‘idle’, ‘marginal’ or ‘degraded’.
In the case of Sierra Leone, for example, claims that the Bovid project
has been located on marginal land are highly contentious and do not
demonstrate an effective understanding of land-use under smallholder
farming systems. Upland rice farming – the main food production
system in rural areas – is based on a system of rotational fallowing,
whereby there is a need to frequently relocate to new ‘idle’ land. This
decreases the willingness of landowning farmers to grant land to
outsiders on a secure basis, due to the necessity of having those lands
on reserve for their own fallowing needs (Unruh & Turray ). What
may be perceived to be ‘idle’ land by the outsider is most often far from
the case. Moreover, the local environmental consequences resulting
from the continuously cultivated and mono-cropped plantation agricul-
ture favourable to the commercial production of biofuels are that they
adversely affect soil quality and fertility, biodiversity and water availability
and quality (Magdoff ).
In summary, it is apparent that the political-economic drivers that
have fuelled global biofuel expansion are complex, contradictory and
framed by multiple discourses. Bioenergy feedstocks, such as sugar cane
or oil palm, are typical plantation crops of the colonial era, and critics
point to the danger of neo-colonial processes of accumulation and
dispossession simply being reproduced in a new context (Bernstein
; Li ; Hall et al. ). Consequently, for some scholars, the
global political economy that has emerged around biofuels over the last
decade appears set to intensify inequalities in developing countries
and ‘reinforce and extend previous waves of livelihood displacement’
(Dauvergne & Neville : ). Other observers, on the other hand,
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seem more optimistic, pointing out that emerging biofuels alliances
will allow some actors to reap considerable beneﬁts, although these
will undoubtedly be unequal and mediated by power relationships. In
the next section, this dichotomy is explored in further detail as the
discussion turns to the challenges linked to global efforts to manage the
‘sustainability’ of biofuels, particularly as they are applied in governing
standards.
M A N A G I N G S U S T A I N A B I L I T Y
While the above-mentioned drivers shaping the wider global political
biofuels economy have proved to be highly controversial, these
controversies have, in turn, contributed to numerous endeavours to
incorporate such concerns into the wider governance structure that has
shaped biofuels investments. Efforts to manage and govern these
controversies have been attempted at different scales including inter-
governmental, regional and national, and non-governmental (Scarlat
& Dallemand ; Lin ). For example, the Global Bioenergy
Partnership (GBEP) is a global intergovernmental initiative led by
the FAO, but the USA’s Renewable Fuel Standard, the EU Renewable
Energy Directive (EU RED) and the UK’s Renewable Transport Fuels
Obligation (RTFO) have all incorporated some form of sustainability
criteria as mandatory requirements into policy. Non-governmental
initiatives include standards and certiﬁcation schemes, whether
initiated by industry or NGOs, that include schemes covering particular
commodities that provide ‘feedstocks’ to biofuels processors, such
as palm oil, soy and sugar (Fortin & Richardson forthcoming), or
endeavour to regulate the biofuels production process more generally.
Some of these schemes have in turn become indirectly incorporated
into public regulatory efforts – for example, both the International
Sustainability and Carbon Certiﬁcation (ISCC) and the Roundtable on
Sustainable Biofuels (RSB) have been approved by the EU Commission
whereby biofuels production that is certiﬁed under one of these
schemes is deemed to satisfy the EU sustainability criteria.
Such initiatives have been criticised from a number of quarters.
In relation to voluntary standards and certiﬁcation schemes, Dauvergne
& Neville () have argued that such voluntarism in sustainability
initiatives is limited. Furthermore, they have argued that, ‘for landless
and non-agrarian rural peoples’, such initiatives ‘do not solve, and may
even exacerbate, the problems that industrial and globalised biofuel
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production cause for land rights and land tenure’ (: ).
Mol meanwhile warns that such standards are likely to incorporate
the environmental issues and problematisations of the ‘cosmopolitans
(such as climate change) rather than those of the locals (who are
concerned with water and soil degradation)’ (: ). Furthermore,
he recognises that such standards can be seen as ‘green imperialism’,
restricting developing countries’ ability to participate in production
(: ). Moreover, McMichael adds that ‘poverty alleviation
serves as a proxy for an ‘agrofuels project’ . . . [which] gains currency
by appealing to an urgent need for alternative, sustainable energy
sources . . . [and] the criterion of sustainability . . . legitimises this project’
(: ).
Drawing on the case of the Swiss biofuels company Bovid Agroenergy
operating in Sierra Leone, this paper aims to consider the incorporation
of sustainability standards in their operations, and to explore how these
become shaped and operationalised by a range of underlying agendas.
Although our research on multi-stakeholder sustainability standards
(e.g. see Fortin,  forthcoming) has led to a particular interest in the
RSB, the analysis is applicable to a wide range of sustainability initiatives.
Indeed, according to Bovid, in addition to the RSB, the company has
also committed itself to comply with a long list of international ethical
business standards, including the UN Global Compact, the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the Equator Principles and the
International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) Performance Standards on
Social and Environmental Sustainability. This also includes the African
Development Bank’s environmental and social safeguards policies,
the International Finance Corporation’s performance standards, and
the EU bio-energy environmental and social sustainability standards.
According to the company’s ofﬁcial public engagement literature:
‘The Project will be a ground-breaking initiative in that it integrates
environmental and social criteria at all levels of its business model,
combining a proﬁtable ﬁnancial investment with a truly sustainable
operation’.
While particular forms of knowledge have been incorporated
into the sustainability standards against which production processes
will be measured and validated, the operational conditions of their
incorporation are also important. Not only do such standards endeavour
to ‘set . . . the bounds on the legitimate and illegitimate exercise of
power’ (Miller : ) but, in their implementation, they will also
be shaped by that operational context which will together give rise
to new practices amongst new networks of actors and, in turn, new
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power relations. In comparing how the company has incorporated
sustainability standards into its operations with the environment-
development agendas of other ‘stakeholders’, such as the government
or project-affected communities, it becomes clear that both the
interests and priorities, and how these are translated into interpretations
of sustainability, vary considerably. Such an appreciation is vital for
understanding the ways in which such powerful actors are drawing
upon, and themselves shaping through the application of a variety
of operational technologies, the knowledge and the governing
practices produced by such sustainability standards. In turn, this is
contributing to a changing governance landscape and wider global
political economy within which bioenergy is being produced, processed
and consumed.
Mol (: ) notes the increasing ‘global mobility’ of standards
and the shift ‘towards further harmonisation and uniform standardis-
ation of biofuel products, markets and regulatory regimes’. Certainly for
those companies that are endeavouring to certify their products through
the application of regional or indeed global sustainability standards,
such standards can be said to be increasingly globally mobile, but
whether such mobility is being achieved through harmonisation and
uniform standardisation in practice needs to be interrogated. And while
it is important also to question how such standards deﬁne ‘sustain-
ability’, the question becomes more complicated, however, as the
standards become interpreted by different operations, in different
places at different times, and then re-interpreted by auditors in a
certiﬁcation process that involves assessing the extent to which such
standards have been appropriately applied.
In the next two sections of the paper, we turn our attention to this
complex and, at times, contradictory process, as we focus in more detail
on the case of Sierra Leone to unpack different interpretations of
sustainability and critically explore how these are applied, whose
agendas may be represented and why. The following section provides
the context for Bovid’s bioenergy investment by presenting a brief
overview of poverty and agrarian change in Sierra Leone’s post-conﬂict
period, focusing primarily on the perspectives of the government and
project-affected communities. The next section then goes on to provide
a more detailed account of the project from the position of the
company, and more speciﬁcally how sustainability initiatives are
conceived and operationalised in terms of risk to company operations
and its investors.
 R O Y M A C O N A C H I E A N D E L I Z A B E T H F O R T I N
P O V E R T Y , A G R A R I A N C H A N G E A N D B I O F U E L I N V E S T M E N T
I N S I E R R A L E O N E
Sierra Leone has recently emerged from a long period of political
instability and civil war and is currently ranked th out of
 countries on the UN Human Development Index (United Nations
Development Programme ). The country’s economy and quality
of life deteriorated rapidly during the protracted conﬂict of the s,
when many rural people were forced to ﬂee their homes due to attacks
from warring factions. More than , farm families were displaced
during the conﬂict, and agricultural production was so severely
dislocated that by  only % of the annual rice requirement
(the staple food) was produced domestically (Economist Intelligence
Unit ). In the immediate aftermath of the war, some ,
displaced persons returned to their villages of origin (United Nations
) and, as rural communities have embarked on the long process of
rebuilding their mainly farming-based livelihoods, many individuals are
now once again growing food crops for the ﬁrst time in many years.
While the legacies of the war undoubtedly continue to have a
profound impact on present-day rural society in Sierra Leone, the
factors responsible for the erosion of the agrarian economy go back
much further. Most notably, during the s and early s under
Siaka Stevens’ APC government, an over-valued currency, subsidised
food imports and under-pricing by government marketing boards
suppressed the agricultural economy, which had always employed
more than three-quarters of the national workforce (Sellies & Wanders
). At that time, the conservation of chieftaincy and customary law
structures had become a primary strategy for maintaining indirect
political control over the countryside, while at the same time insulating
central government from popular accountability. In the face of acute
economic decline during the s, the oppression of the country’s
burgeoning youth population by rural elites and the erosion of rural
moral economies based on patron–client relationships further com-
pounded rural poverty. These conditions, it has been argued, left large
numbers of youths responsive to recruitment by warring factions and
were ‘easy prey for unscrupulous forces who exploited their disenchant-
ment to wreak vengeance against the ruling elite’ (Truth & Recon-
ciliation Commission : ). The implications of this crisis, Bolten
(: ) further adds, have been profound:
. . . dissatisfaction with the critical state of farming was one of the main
reasons many young people were so angry about their poverty that they were
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willing to join the RUF in the ﬁrst place . . . The further draining of labor,
destruction of tools and seed stocks, and bush encroachment on farms
caused by ten years of war have dealt crushing blows to the already fragile
remnants of agriculture in Sierra Leone.
In Sierra Leone’s present post-war period, concerns for food security,
rural unemployment and the so-called ‘crisis of youth’ are thus
particularly sensitive issues, all of which have returned to centre stage
on policy agendas. The present APC government is desperate to
encourage international investors who will ﬁnance initiatives that
address these key issues, and President Ernest Bai Koroma has made
it well known that he believes foreign investment under a market-led
approach to be the panacea for meeting the country’s challenges. This
strategy was formalised in Sierra Leone’s long-term National Sustainable
Agriculture Development Plan (NSADP) in , and it is thus
unsurprising that the government has shown overwhelming support
for Bovid Agroenergy’s recent bioenergy investment in Bombali and
Tonkolili Districts. In a recent keynote address on  February ,
during the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) at the
project site, President Koroma was quoted as saying:
. . . this is the biggest agricultural project ever in the history of Sierra Leone
with an approximated investment of $ million in a couple of years:
When we talk about diversifying and investing in agriculture, this project
sends a clear message to all that we back our intentions with actions.
(Turay & Conteh )
The Bovid project builds on the opportunity presented by a growing
market for bioenergy and biofuels in Europe and Africa as well as
preferential trade agreements and suitable climate and lands in Sierra
Leone. Bovid ultimately aims to produce ,m of ethanol per
annum, primarily for export to the European Union market, but
MW of power will be fed into the national grid. Supporters of the
investment have high expectations for operations, which they claim will
simultaneously stimulate an enabling environment for future invest-
ment, provide job opportunities for youth and contribute to food
security by increasing local food production. Such aims ﬁt squarely
within the government’s ‘business-friendly approach’ to investment,
through which it aims to attract large companies with big projects and
in turn promote commercial agriculture through private sector
participation. It also reﬂects the agenda of the country’s second and
most recent PRSP (–), which identiﬁes the encouragement
of agribusiness as a strategic pillar of development because of the
possibilities that it supposedly presents for simultaneously promoting
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food security, poverty reduction and employment creation. In short,
the Bovid investment satisﬁes the government’s desire for large
agriculture and industrial projects that have the potential to mesh
closely with the seven key strategic priorities of its social investment
policy, as follows:
. To provide job opportunities for Sierra Leoneans at all skill levels.
. To provide signiﬁcant foreign direct investment.
. To be export-oriented.
. To make extensive use of local raw materials.
. To ensure the development and transfer of a variety of skills
and technology.
. To produce a surplus of electricity for commercial purposes.
. To make use of renewable energy resources.
While the government has also made food security one of its main
priorities, at the forefront of this agenda is the promotion of foreign
investment, with large land leases for export-oriented plantation
agriculture. This approach, shaped by Rostovian discourses around
‘modernisation’ and ‘progress’, is embedded in the strongly held
development narrative that African countries are destined to experience
an agrarian transition similar to that of Europe in the eighteenth
century (Li ), if they pursue the right path to development.
A central aspect of this trajectory, according to the World Bank, is
for governments to stimulate the transition by removing the barriers
to investment. Such a market-led approach for private sector develop-
ment of commercial agriculture is based on the assumption that the
private sector drives the organisation of value chains that bring the
market to smallholders and commercial farms, a model that the World
Bank has referred to as ‘Agriculture for Development’ (World Bank
).
To send the right signals to foreign investors such as Bovid,
the government has established the Sierra Leone Investment and
Export Promotion Agency (SLIEPA) with the direct assistance of the
World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC). Amongst
the many incentives offered to foreign investors, including tax holidays,
low agricultural labour rates, and ‘ﬂexible’ labour regulation, one of
the major pillars of SLIEPA’s marketing strategy is that Sierra Leone
can offer investors vast areas of ‘available’, ‘unused’ or ‘under-utilised’
land at low lease rates. As noted by Li (), for international
companies, who are driven by the goal of maximizing proﬁt, access
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to cheap and abundant labour and land are essential elements of their
investment:
In most cases . . . land acquisition takes the form of an investment by
a corporate actor bearing capital, and seeking proﬁt. Such an investor
operates in a competitive context that compels it to seek maximum proﬁt
on the capital it deploys. The attraction for investors is vast areas of free and
virtually ‘empty’ land on which they can install the optimal technology-labor
regime for proﬁtable production. (Li : )
Bovid has leased , ha of prime agricultural land for a period of
 years and sugar cane plantations will cover , ha, in addition
to , ha which will be developed as part of the project’s Farmer
Development Programme (FDP). In discussions with Bovid’s HSSE
Manager based in Sierra Leone, it became clear that the company
believes that this latter investment will impact positively on food
availability, as this surface will be divided into  community ﬁelds to
be established and sown by the company and dedicated to staple food
production (mainly rice and cassava) to the beneﬁt of the local
population. There are some , people that live in areas affected
by the project (Anane & Abiwu ), and in line with the RSB Principles
and Criteria for Sustainable Biofuels Production, ofﬁcial company literature
states that Bovid is ‘actively engaging with those whom the project may
affect, the project affected people, and has structured the project in a
manner designed to ensure that the views of the local population are
accommodated and taken into account so far as possible and ensured
that the local communities have been engaged in the project from the
beginning’. Considering the project-affected population as a homo-
geneous group, however, as most deﬁnitions of ‘community’ tend to do,
is problematic given that the local population is highly socially
differentiated and characterised by conﬂicting values and unequal
power relationships. Vermeulen & Cotula add that although community
consultation is now a standard component of negotiations around
projects that involve large-scale land acquisitions in Africa, the voices of
marginalised actors often become stiﬂed: ‘local people’s capacity to
bargain or give free consent to investments is limited by their lack of
access to economic and institutional alternatives’ (: ).
Our discussions with project-affected community members revealed
that their underlying agendas and expectations were vastly different
from the positions of the government and the company. Indeed, focus
group discussions and semi-structured interviews were carried out with
a wide range of community actors (e.g. chiefs, youths, women, hired
company labourers, displaced farmers) and it was apparent that
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perceptions varied considerably. However, for many individuals in
project-affected communities, the concept of ‘sustainability’ may be
summarised as being fundamentally about reconciling livelihoods and
the environmental resources upon which they depend. Field research
carried out in the three settlements of Lungi Acre, Yankasa and
Marokie in the project area in July , conﬁrmed that there were
signiﬁcant concerns about the ‘sustainability’ of the company’s
operations from many of those who were living in and around the
project area. These ranged from contentions over land acquisition, to
the disruption of traditional sources of income, to increasing poverty,
and claims of failed promises by Bovid. However, while it was clear that
even within communities there were ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ spawning
from the project’s activities, with some individuals having considerably
better access to beneﬁts than others, interviewees referred to two
overarching issues that were at the forefront of concerns over
‘sustainability’.
The ﬁrst issue concerned land access and control. Central to the
governments’ promotion campaign to secure foreign investment in
rural areas has been the message that there are vast tracts of ‘unused’
arable land available for agricultural development. For example, on
the SLIEPA website, the abundance of available agricultural land and
an ideal agro-ecological setting are highlighted as key selling points for
potential investors:
Only  percent of the country’s . million hectares of cultivatable land
were being farmed as recently as ; growing seasons in most parts of
the country exceed  days per year; annual rainfall averages ,
millimeters ( inches); and irrigation potential of the country’s nine
major and three minor rivers is largely untapped.
However, a recent report on land investment produced by the Oakland
Institute () suggests that SLIEPA’s frequently cited notion that
% of the country’s arable land is available to investors is based on
outdated land survey documents that are over  years old. Moreover,
as noted earlier, such estimates do not reﬂect an accurate under-
standing of how the smallholder farming system in Sierra Leone works.
Smallholder agriculture is heavily reliant on the bush fallow system,
whereby farms are cultivated for a number of years until the soil’s
fertility is reduced, but are then left fallow for as long as – years to
recover. Land that is left ‘idle’ remains vital for providing key
environmental services, maintaining biodiversity and serving as a
reservoir for essential livelihood resources for poor people, such as
ﬁrewood, animal fodder or medicinal plants. As recognised by
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McMichael (: ), ‘marginal peoples’ often depend on ‘margin-
al’, or non-productive, land for their livelihoods and, with insecure land
tenure, will be most vulnerable to its alienation.
In rural Sierra Leone, land is held under various forms of informal
communal tenure, with the paramount chief serving as the ultimate
custodian of the land. Unruh & Turray () note that in Sierra
Leone, there are as many different forms of customary tenure law as
there are language groups, but in most places, male family and lineage
heads representing the ‘original’ settlers of an area appear to have
control over land. However, although the customary laws that regulate
access to land may appear to be clearly deﬁned, tenure systems have also
been known to exhibit a certain degree of ﬂexibility. In some cases, as
an early study by Richards () in the Mende region of the country
suggests, land rights and even their associated family histories have
actually been ‘bought’ and ‘sold’ in the past. In other instances, the
physical ‘ownership’ of a piece of land may not actually change hands,
but its possession or usufructory rights can change, as land is circulated
through inheritance, loan, lease or pledge (Bassett & Crummey ).
The point being made here is that land ‘ownership’ is not always a
black and white issue in Sierra Leone. When Bovid initially negotiated its
project land leases through chiefs and landowners,  village boundary
sites were demarcated by the company’s surveyors in order to determine
which land would be used and which families would receive compen-
sation for the use of their lands. While the company appears to have
made a concerted effort to ensure that it was adhering to Sierra Leonean
laws and behaving in a socially responsible fashion, it is clear that the
redistribution of land for biofuel production will make it next to
impossible for local land-users to access the natural resources upon
which their livelihoods depend, or to engage in traditional rotational
fallowing practices. Moreover, even though the MOU signed by the
company stipulates that landowners are to be compensated through
lease agreements, critics warn that landless households who rent
land on an annual basis could potentially be displaced (Andrew & van
Vlaenderen ). In a number of cases, long-standing land disputes
between families have also been exacerbated and in one case, the
sensitivities of a local court case that goes back to  have been
re-ignited. These disputed claims have further been complicated by
post-war return issues regarding land, where overlapping claims have
come into question (Unruh & Turray ).
The more serious concern over land, however, involves the issue of
how some individuals in project-impacted communities, who are now
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landless, will gain access to food. While the company has committed
itself to a Farmer Development Programme (FDP), which will prepare
and sow more than , ha of ﬁelds for local food production and train
some , farmers in improved farming techniques, it is apparent
that not all those living within the project area will beneﬁt. For example,
as explained by one resident of Lungi Acre:
The problem is that all the farmland [around Lungi Acre] has been taken
up by the company, and not everyone has been lucky enough to get a job.
Here we are surrounded by the company’s operations, but no community
farmland has been provided for us. So I am very worried about how I will
feed my family.
Moreover, in a recent impact evaluation of the project (Anane & Abiwu
), it was reported that in some cases, affected communities have
been provided with alternative communal farmlands that are smaller
than those they previously possessed. The distances between their
homes and their new farmlands are often much greater, which has made
it difﬁcult for members of the affected communities to access their farms
as they used to. While it is clear that the mechanical ploughing provided
by the company has made it possible to prepare a considerable volume
of land in a short period of time, Bolten (: ) also points out that
contrary to the beliefs of many, tractors are not well suited to the high
clay-content of African soils in the Bolilands, and the disturbance of
the gravel under the soil is not appropriate for rice farming. Reports
also suggest (e.g. Anane & Abiwu ) that there have already been
problems with the company’s promises to provide ploughing, harrowing
and seeds, which arrived too late for the planting season in .
As a consequence, there was less food produced in the communities
as farmers were not able to plant on time.
The second main issue widely mentioned in interviews with project-
affected people concerned the question of labour and employment.
While labour relationships are clearly central to the success of the
operations for all project stakeholders, there appeared to be
contradictions in interpretations of the role that labour should assume
in ‘sustainability’. Interviews carried out with residents in the three
project communities revealed that many individuals were initially
supportive of the new labour regime being proposed by the company,
in anticipation that a decent living wage would be offered. Indeed,
other research carried out in and around Makeni by Bolten ()
suggests that many young people in the area today are no longer
interested in being subsistence farmers, but are set on entering the
‘modern’ world of consumerism as wage labourers. This position ties
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into a wider body of literature on de-agrarianisation in sub-Saharan
Africa (Bryceson & Jamal ; Ellis ), which argues that young
people continent-wide are seeking an ‘exit option’ out of small-scale
farming, with the hope of securing a better life through the off-farm
wage economy.
However, those living in the project-impacted villages complained
bitterly that, much to their disappointment, the salaries being paid by
Bovid were not sufﬁcient to live on, and there had been a number of
misunderstandings concerning the promises made by the company.
According to Bovid’s HSSE Manager, the company will create , jobs
for local people, which will inject an estimated US$. million into the
local economy each year. However, in discussions with individuals in
the affected communities it was revealed that people hired from the
villages tended to work as casual labourers, and often for less than three
months at a time. Interviewees complained that the majority of local
people employed were temporarily laid-off after two or three months.
This pattern was conﬁrmed in a project evaluation report which noted
that ‘. . . workers are also laid off when the planting season is over and
that means having to wait till the next planting season to continue with
life as a farmer. This situation unleashes frustration, poverty and hunger
on the unemployed casual workers who have families to feed’ (Anane
& Abiwu ).
For project-affected communities, obtaining a living wage is a
necessary trade-off for relinquishing access to their land. However,
securing a sufﬁcient wage is unlikely given the very contradictions
inherent in the global capitalist system, whereby proﬁt maximisation is
dependent on externalising costs and pushing down the price of labour.
As Redclift () argued many years ago, ‘sustainable’ development
and global capitalism are incompatible, because the quest to accumulate
capital always undermines the social and environmental resources upon
which it depends. Li (: ) further adds that
It is against prevailing capital-logic to expect private investors to take the
lead in designing and managing schemes that reduce their proﬁts in favor
of the labor of their attached smallholders/suppliers. For this reason,
poverty reduction cannot be left to corporations.
While the government’s position is that foreign investment in large-scale
agricultural projects is the key to ‘sustainability’ and will stimulate an
agrarian transition based on a new wage driven economy, paradoxically,
it is undermining this agenda and increasing poverty through
the promotion of a cheap pool of labour. According to SLIEPA’s
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promotional material for investors, agricultural labour rates in Sierra
Leone are exceedingly low at US$– per day, which is considerably less
than in alternate locations in Asia or Latin America. For companies
such as Bovid, proﬁt largely depends on an abundant supply of cheap,
disciplined labour, and for this very reason, neither poverty alleviation
nor local concerns for ‘sustainable’ development are likely to be the
most pressing considerations.
U N D E R S T A N D I N G A P P R O A C H E S T O ‘ S U S T A I N A B I L I T Y ’ :
T H E B O V I D P E R S P E C T I V E
Over the last three decades, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
agendas have become increasingly important business strategies
for multinational companies, particularly for those operating in the
global South. There is now a burgeoning critical literature that explores
the role and impact of CSR in the developing world, and how the
‘sustainability’ agenda has become operationalised in business practices.
These critiques of CSR have encompassed a diverse range of contexts
including, for example, its analysis in relation to the extractive industries
(Hilson ), its inﬂuence on labour practices in the textiles and
garments industry (Miller ), how it has shaped the policies and
practices of pharmaceutical companies in poor countries (Leisinger
), and how it has been strategically utilised to manage risk in
agricultural supply chains (Teuscher et al. ). While a number of
authors have pointed out that the principle of ‘sustainability’ works
best in CSR agendas when it coincides with a company’s economic
or regulatory interests (e.g. Porter & Kramer ), more sceptical
observers have argued that most CSR agendas are little more than smoke
and mirrors, allowing ample scope for ‘free-riding’ by economic agents
who reap the beneﬁts without bearing the costs (Utting ).
Nonetheless, still others have maintained that with the advent of
globalisation, CSR agendas have become increasingly attractive for
global corporations because a signiﬁcant shift in market power has
increased the social risks of doing business in poor, developing countries
(Kytle & Ruggie ).
In this ﬁnal section of the paper, attention is turned to the position of
Bovid, which has publically indicated that socially responsible business
practices are of paramount concern to the company’s operations. More
speciﬁcally, however, the analysis demonstrates that the company’s
interest in the sustainability agenda goes beyond mere philanthropy – it
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has become a key aspect of its business strategy for managing ﬁnancial
and social risk, and accessing regulated markets in the EU. According
to ofﬁcial company literature, Bovid has a straightforward policy
regarding CSR: ‘be proﬁtable, obey the law, be ethical and be a good
corporate citizen’. As such, based on the law of Sierra Leone and the IFC
Performance Standards, Bovid has conducted an extensive analysis of
the environmental, social and health impacts of the project (ESHIA),
which has been informed by  specialist studies. Stakeholder en-
gagement and public disclosure have been integral elements of the
execution of the ESHIA and the land lease process. In accordance with
international standards, all draft reports were released for public review,
and the key ﬁndings were presented to all interested and affected parties
at the national, provincial and local levels.
According to the ESHIA, Bovid has developed a Social and
Environmental Management Programme (SEMP) with the following
objectives:
. To ensure the project is compliant with applicable national
environmental and social legal requirements.
. To ensure the project is compliant with applicable environmental and
social policies of its lenders.
. To outline the mitigating/enhancing, monitoring, consultative and
institutional measures required to prevent, minimise, mitigate or
compensate for adverse environmental and social impacts and/or to
enhance project-related beneﬁcial impacts.
. To address capacity-building requirements to strengthen its environ-
mental and social capacities if necessary.
However, while the company presents the ‘sustainability’ of operations
at the forefront of its practice, it is important to interrogate the
underlying motivations that are driving this strategy. As is clearly
reﬂected in the main objectives of Bovid’s SEMP, adherence to the
social and environmental concerns of project-affected communities and
the agenda set out in the government’s laws are central to anticipating
and reducing potential sources of business risk, but in doing so, there
are many actors that the company must satisfy. As will be illustrated in
the discussion below, in protecting its ‘social license to operate’, Bovid’s
business strategy accommodates a multiplicity of sustainability agendas,
and in doing so seeks to insulate the company from potential risks such
as labour unrest, environmental disasters, potential government
regulation, or damage to its reputation in the eyes of consumers.
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For example, when asked about how the company had interpreted
the concept of ‘sustainability’, Bovid’s HSSE Manager ﬁrst reported
that the issue of food security was of key importance to company, but it
later became clear that this was largely because it was such a major
concern of the government and donors. This sustainability issue, it was
explained, was primarily being addressed through the two main social
development initiatives that were being directed towards the project-
affected communities –The Farmer Development Programme (FDP)
and the Farmer Field School and Life School (FFLS). However, it also
became apparent that Bovid’s framework for delivering sustainable
development was also nested within a broader set of structures at the
global scale. The wider global political economy in which Bovid
Agroenergy is operating – its head ofﬁce is situated in Switzerland and
it is producing biofuels in Sierra Leone predominantly for the European
market – has a considerable inﬂuence on its approach to ‘sustainability’.
To begin with, if its biofuels are to contribute to the EU mandates in
relation to the consumption of biofuels, operations will have to meet
the EU RED sustainability criteria. Although the EU Commission
has approved certain private standards schemes, including the RSB,
its own criteria incorporated into the Directive are not set in stone
as has been seen recently, for example, in efforts by scientists
to lobby the European Commission in relation to the incorporation
of the calculation of indirect land-use change in those criteria.
These wider politics in relation to biofuels and their sustainability
requirements contribute to shaping biofuels producers’ approaches to
sustainability.
Since sustainability standards are voluntary, a number of scholars
have argued that for some companies, there may be a clear motivation
to improve corporate reputations and inﬂuence the nature of global
debates surrounding sustainability (Auty ; Blowﬁeld and Frynas
). For example, the RSB certiﬁcation scheme, just one of the sets of
standards to which Bovid is seeking compliancy, is designed to be taken
up by corporations through their adoption of a ‘risk-based’ approach to
audit. This aligns with the wider CSR ‘win-win’ discourse that constructs
‘sustainability’ in terms of risk, a frame that positions sustainable
development in the interest both of corporations and of its stakeholders
who are affected by its operations. In the words of Bovid’s Deputy
Managing Director:
It boils down to the fact that I am putting, or we are, the company, an
enormous amount of money at risk. It’s our money, it’s our own money, so
why would I not look at as many risks as possible? Why would I choose
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to ignore very obvious risks which have to do with the quality of soil, or
quality of water? . . . how many people are living in an area, and where are
they living? Why would I just ignore those kinds of fundamentals?
However, regardless of how companies perceive the relationship
between CSR and risk management, the reality for most biofuels
operators who aim to access EU markets is that they need to be
compliant with an EU-recognised sustainability standards scheme. In
this sense, there is a danger that companies may place a dispropor-
tionate emphasis on meeting global performance standards, rather than
actually focusing on addressing the speciﬁc social contexts within which
their sustainability strategies are located (Gilberthorpe & Banks ).
Moreover, in meeting performance standards, a company’s operations
must also be audited in order for it to become certiﬁed according to that
scheme. Audit and certiﬁcation costs are not insigniﬁcant, particularly
for smaller companies, and if standards criteria change, the cost of
addressing these must be taken up by the company. For example, as
explained by the Deputy Managing Director of Bovid:
The health matters in IFC performance standards were changed and
upgraded [with the result being that] . . . we had to spend another £,
immediately. And that’s not small money, you know, especially if you are
a smaller company and you have good ambitions.
Accordingly, for smaller companies such as Bovid, it may prove
ﬁnancially savvy to speculate on which sustainability proposals may
eventually become incorporated at the level of policy, and endeavour to
adopt these from the outset. Politically, this may also enable operators
to position themselves more favourably with other actors, including
consumers, but also investors, who will themselves also impose certain
conditionalities over their investments. More than % of Bovid’s
ﬁnancing is provided by public development banks and, for example,
the terms of its ‘Comprehensive Resettlement Policy Framework’ were
set down by the African Development Bank. For Bovid, the company’s
approach has been to consider the strictest sustainability standards
proposals emerging from the European Parliament, with the aim
of fulﬁlling these before they become law. The agenda driving this,
according to Bovid’s Deputy Managing Director, is more than just the
desire to become a good corporate citizen – it is, once again, about
protecting the company against risk, this time in the guise of enormous
future consultancy and certiﬁcation costs.
For Bovid, it was thus deemed more cost-effective to ‘design-
in’ sustainability principles to the company’s  management plans
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from the outset, than to meet the risks as they might have arisen. The
strategy is clearly described by the company’s Deputy Managing
Director:
If you are fortunate like we were back in –, and you start
from scratch . . . from a piece of blank paper, you can simply design
sustainability into your model. It is not an add-on, it is integrated and
designed in. You sort of design-in or design-out whatever is considered to
have a negative impact as much as you can, and that’s how we have looked at
this process.
Accordingly, consultants were contracted to work on various aspects of
the company’s approach to sustainability from environmental, social,
health, safety and security perspectives. In doing so, a variety of laws,
regulations and standards were drawn upon, including the RSB. But this
approach, no matter how proactive it may appear to be, does raise an
important issue: when sustainability standards, and indeed sustainability
as a risk deﬁned by the corporation, are integrated into the company’s
operations from the outset, the question of whether these principles are
destined to displace ‘real’ issues of sustainability that arise in people’s
day-to-day lives comes to the fore. Similar concerns have been raised by
other researchers with respect to how extractive companies implement
community development programmes with little knowledge of the socio-
cultural contexts of the people’s lives in which they operate (Hilson &
Banchirigah ; Tschakert ). In short, the issues of sustainability
that arise in people’s day-to-day lives may be conceptualised in ways so
different from those incorporated within business management plans
that they simply become inconceivable within the terms conceptualised
by the company. For example, whereas ‘sustainability’ for people
affected by Bovid’s operations may be deﬁned according to their ability
to sustain traditional farming practices in an area that has been farmed
by their family for generations, ‘sustainability’ framed in terms of the
company’s perceived risks looks very different. Accordingly, as admitted
by the company’s Deputy Managing Director:
For our land take as a whole, we needed to prove that we were not taking
land away from the local communities. We could only prove that . . . by really
engaging with the local communities and making sure there’s enough
arable land. Because it can’t be perceived that we are taking all the land
away.
For Bovid, this was a prudent course of action that made good business
sense and subsequently led to the design and implementation of
the company’s FDP, noted earlier. The risk identiﬁed was damage to
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the company’s reputation on the grounds that it was exacerbating food
insecurity, and the solution to this was one that in turn ﬁt with the
wider plans of the project in terms of its land use in the local area.
However, this approach does not incorporate other aspects of sustain-
ability for local people that may be based upon considerations relating
to their current state of poverty, or culture, or tradition. So while
sustainability standards may offer hope to local people that they
might achieve some kind of purchase in having their own framings
of sustainability incorporated into the future actions of companies
operating in their area, such risk-based approaches to certiﬁcation
adopted by the standards further entrench this powerful approach
to sustainability.
C O N C L U S I O N
In exploring the context of Bovid Agroenergy’s recent biofuel invest-
ment in Sierra Leone, it is apparent that the concept of ‘sustainability’ is
crucial to all project stakeholders. However, differences in interpret-
ations of sustainability, and, more speciﬁcally, how such interpretations
are shaped by conﬂicting interests and underlying agendas, have
increasingly resulted in mounting tension between different groups
of actors. For grassroots actors living in and around the project area,
the sustainability of the company’s operations is framed around key
livelihood questions that primarily concern land, labour and food-
security. The government, on the other hand, appears more concerned
with nurturing an environment that will put agribusiness at the centre
of the country’s development trajectory, and thereby send the right
signals to future bioenergy investors. While the agendas of both project-
affected communities and the government must, to a certain extent, be
embraced by Bovid in the design of its operations, the company’s core
consideration in implementing sustainable practices is in its ability to
mitigate social and ﬁnancial risk to the company’s operations and its
investors. The outcomes of struggles between these stakeholders, and
the way that the rhetoric of sustainability is ultimately reiﬁed in practice,
is a process that is shaped by power relationships that are conditioned by
the wider political economy of bioenergy.
While considerable efforts have been made by biofuels producers
to manage sustainability through global standards, the effectiveness of
these has been challenged on multiple fronts. On one level, as we hope
has become clear in our analysis of the Bovid case, the attractiveness
of many standards schemes is that they provide their compliers with
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a ‘green light’ to access speciﬁc regulated markets. So for some
companies, the underlying motivation for certiﬁcation may there-
fore have little to do with addressing the needs of communities
or governments, but may, in fact, be driven by desires to target external
export markets. On another level, the analysis also raises the question of
whether or not the pursuit of ‘blueprint’ sustainability standards
schemes might actually play a role in decontextualising local develop-
ment needs. In the case of Bovid’s investment, it is evident that the
company’s risk-based approach to certiﬁcation has primarily become a
mechanism for protecting both the project and its investors. In extreme
cases, as other scholars have pointed out in other contexts (e.g. see
Gilberthorpe & Banks ), an over-emphasis on meeting global
performance standards has led to inappropriate and ill-conceived
development outcomes at the local level, which have generated further
fragmentation and inequality.
In short, power plays a central role in reinforcing the most
commanding interpretations of ‘sustainability’, as they become con-
ditioned to serve particular interests. As has been pointed out by Mosse
(: ), ‘. . . power lies in the narratives that maintain an organis-
ation’s own deﬁnition of the problem . . . [and] success in development
depends upon the stabilization of a particular interpretation . . .’.
Dauvergne & Neville () add that in weak states such as Sierra
Leone – where governments often lack the power required to inﬂuence
the underlying agendas of transnational companies – an absence of state
regulatory oversight and control makes it even more unlikely that
voluntary corporate initiatives will lead to meaningful environmental
and social outcomes. The authors note that the track record for the
failure of CSR initiatives in related sectors such as the agrifoods industry
is well documented in the literature (see Utting & Clapp ; Clapp &
Fuchs ) and should serve as a warning for designing and
implementing sustainability initiatives within the biofuels industry. In
order for sustainability standards to become effectively operationalised,
and therefore a potential vehicle for positive change, standards
organisations such as the RSB – despite their commitment to multi-
stakeholder governance –must seek acceptability, credibility and ulti-
mately legitimacy, from multiple and competing sources. At the very
core of this task is a more explicit appreciation of the unequal power
relations between different stakeholders, and a recognition of their
varying agendas, which will determine the ways in which the contradic-
tions of sustainability are resolved.
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. Bovid Agroenergy is a pseudonym, used because of the researchers’ conﬁdentiality agreement
with the company in question when undertaking their research.
. For a critical discussion on how bioenergy expansion has been shaped by its perceived
potential for mitigating climate change see Franco et al. (), Dauvergne & Neville (),
Searchinger et al. () or Gillon (). For elaboration on how the rising price of fossil fuels and
concerns for national energy security have driven biofuel production see Kojima & Klytchnikova
(), Franco et al. () or Dauvergne & Neville ().
. For example, for good critiques of this perspective see Li (), McMichael (a) or Watts
().
. This trajectory is most notably embedded in the narrative that the World Bank refers to as ‘new
agriculture for development’. See the World Bank’s World Development Report  (World Bank
) for elaboration.
. While the relative impact that biofuel markets have on commodity and food prices is highly
debated, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has estimated that biofuels were responsible for
–% of the food price spike in  when  million tonnes of cereals were diverted into
biofuel production (cited in Vidal ).
. For example, the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, Roundtable for Responsible
Soy Production and the Better Sugarcane Initiative (Bonsucro).
. For example, the Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels (RSB) and International Sustainability
and Carbon Certiﬁcation (ISCC).
. Page  of Bovid Agroenergy ‘Fact Sheet’ received from HSSE Manager, Makeni, ...
. See especially Principle  on Planning, Monitoring and Continuous Improvements. <http://rsb.
epﬂ.ch/ﬁles/content/sites/rsb/ﬁles/Biofuels/Version%/PCs%V/--%RSB%
PCs%Version%.pdf>, accessed ...
. SLIEPA website, <http://www.sliepa.org/investment>, accessed ...
. Personal communication, farmer, Lungi Acre, ...
. Personal communication, Bovid HSSE Manager, Makeni, ...
. SLIEPA, http://www.sliepa.org/downloads/sugar-opportunities-sierra-leone
. See: <http://www.afdb.org/ﬁleadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Environmental-and-Social-
Assessments/Addax%Bioenergy%-%ESHIA%summary%-%Final%EN.pdf >,
accessed ...
. See Fortin and Richardson (forthcoming) for further elaboration.
. Telephone interview with Managing Director of Bovid, Geneva, ...
. Telephone interview with Managing Director of Bovid, Geneva, ...
. For smaller companies, such as Bovid, that lack sufﬁcient in-house expertise to deal with
the extremely complex requirements set out in the array of standards, regulations, legislation
and mandates demanded by investors, there is effectively no choice but to turn to international
consultants in order to meet them. These enormous consultancy costs, according to Bovid’s
Managing Director, are the ‘other side’ of meeting global sustainability standards – the hidden,
unspoken costs for biofuels companies that become part and parcel of the adoption of standards
schemes (personal communication with Managing Director, ..).
. Telephone interview with Managing Director of Bovid, Geneva, ...
. Telephone interview with Managing Director of Bovid, Geneva, ...
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